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Abstract 
The empirical study of judicial emotion has enormous but largely untapped potential 
to illuminate a previously underexplored aspect of judging, its processes, outputs, 
and impacts. After defining judicial emotion, this article proposes a theoretical 
taxonomy of approaches to its empirical exploration. It then presents and analyses 
extant examples of such research, with a focus on how the questions they ask fit 
within the taxonomy and the methods they use to answer those questions. It 
concludes by identifying areas for growth in the disciplined, data-based exploration 
of the many facets of judicial emotion. 
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Resumen 
El estudio empírico de las emociones en la judicatura tiene un potencial enorme, pero 
poco explorado, para arrojar luz sobre un aspecto de la profesión judicial poco 
explorado previamente, sus procesos, resultados y efectos. Tras definir la emoción 
judicial, el artículo propone una taxonomía teórica de abordajes a su estudio 
empírico. Después, presenta y analiza ejemplos existentes de esa investigación, 
poniendo especial atención en la forma en que las preguntas que se formulan encajan 
en la taxonomía y en los métodos que utilizan para responder a aquéllas. Concluye 
identificando áreas de crecimiento en el estudio disciplinado y basado en datos de las 
múltiples facetas de la emoción judicial.  
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1. Introduction 
How do we go about learning what we want to know about emotion and judging? 
Empirical work on judicial emotion both shows tremendous potential and is in 
tremendous need of growth. This article aims to support such growth by framing, 
describing, and analysing the questions that empirical researchers of judicial emotion 
are asking; identifying and evaluating the methods we are using to answer them; 
and proposing present areas of strength and need. It presents a snapshot of an 
unfolding research field in the hope of motivating a wide range of researchers to 
pursue the project within a common frame. 
2. Theoretical foundations and definitions 
I use the term “judicial emotion” as an umbrella term for three interrelated 
phenomena.1 The first – judicial emotional experience – captures episodic 
experiences judges have in connection with their work, such as discrete instances of 
sadness, anger, pleasure, or joy, no matter their time duration. The second – judicial 
emotion regulation – captures how judges seek to manage their emotional 
experiences, as well as those of others (such as litigants and lawyers), in light of 
their professional constraints and demands. The third – judicial emotional impacts – 
captures the effects of these experiential and regulatory processes on judges’ 
personal wellbeing and professional performance. Thus broadly defined, judicial 
emotion operates on both the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels. 
My starting assumption is that judges’ basic emotional processes operate as they do 
in all other humans (Maroney 2011a, 2011b). Judges’ emotional experiences are “are 
elicited and differentiated by subjective interpretation of the personal significance of 
events”, and thus reflect and express beliefs about how the world is and values about 
how it should be – that is, they are undergirded by appraisals (Calhoun and Solomon 
1984, Lazarus 1994, Scherer and Ellsworth 2009, p. 45). Such appraisals interact 
with the physiological, experiential, action-oriented, and expressive components of 
emotion in a dynamic fashion (Scherer and Ellsworth 2009), affecting judges’ bodily 
functions and how they process information, reason, and make decisions (Lerner et 
al. 2015, Niedenthal and Ric 2017). These internal componential processes unfold in 
relationship with others, and involve inputs from, and motivate behaviours in, the 
outside world. Judicial emotion reflects assessments of whether others represent a 
source of threat or support; how others view them, and how they would like to be 
viewed; and power and status differentials (Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2016, 
Barrett et al. 2016). Finally, judicial emotion is situated within cultural and social 
contexts that script what emotional experiences and displays are acceptable (Roach 
Anleu and Mack 2013, 2017).  
My second assumption is that being a judge, in a specific judicial role, place, culture, 
and time, has a profound impact on all these emotional processes. Judges’ 
professional milieu affects the stimuli to which they are exposed and the goal 
orientations in service of which they regulate their emotions (Hochschild 1983, 
Wharton 2009, Lively and Weed 2016). One critical goal orientation is the desire to 
satisfy the operative cultural script, which in the contemporary developed West leans 
heavily on the ideal of dispassion (Maroney 2011b). That ideal long has posited that 
the good judge is “divested of all fear, anger, hatred, love, and compassion” (Hobbes 
1651/1904), and remains alive and well; indeed, not long ago the late U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Scalia wrote that “good judges pride themselves” on “the suppression 
of their personal proclivities, including most especially their emotions” (Scalia and 
Garner 2008, p. 32). The extent to which any given judge internalizes that script – 
and not all do, particularly in the post-Legal Realist era (Brennan 1996, Posner 2008, 
                                                 
1 Different countries, and different jurisdictions within a country, subdivide persons serving a judicial 
function into many distinct categories designated by a distinct nomenclature (e.g., “magistrate”, “judge”, 
“chancellor”). I use the umbrella term “judges” to refer to all such persons.  
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Maroney 2011a, 2011b) – would be expected to shape emotional experience, 
regulation, and impacts in a deep way.  
A new wave of empirical work – by which I refer to the systematic collection and 
classification of data concerning “events, circumstances, or processes” (van Boom et 
al. 2018, p. 7) – is now seeking to understand each of these aspects of judicial 
emotion. This wave fills an important gap. Legal empirical studies have grown rapidly 
over the last decades, but the field is largely dominated by the law and economics 
movement and, to a slightly lesser degree, political science (Zorn and Bowie 2010, 
Cross 2012, Epstein and Martin 2014, van Boom et al. 2018). It generally is guided 
by models that exclude emotion, such as rational choice theories (Baum 2010, 
Epstein et al. 2012). The emerging field of the psychology of judging, for its part, has 
left emotion largely unexamined (Klein 2010). Similarly, while the sociological study 
of professional emotional labour is thriving, only a small portion thereof takes judges 
as its subject (Roach Anleu and Mack 2017); the same can be said of the sociology 
of emotion more generally (Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2016). Further, for many 
legal scholars empirical research “remains a ‘black box’, with unfamiliar, obscure 
methods and unclear contributions” (van Boom et al. 2018, p. 3). Empirical study of 
judicial emotion thus has enormous but largely untapped potential to illuminate a 
previously underexplored aspect of judging, its processes, outputs, and impacts.  
3. A proposed taxonomy of empirical research on judicial emotion 
An emerging research field benefits from conceptual parameters within which to 
situate its growth. I previously have proposed a working taxonomy for the field of 
law and emotion more generally, an effort that has proven helpful in shaping that 
field’s disciplined development by isolating and surfacing a hidden infrastructure 
(Maroney 2006). In that spirit, I offer here a closely-related conceptual framework 
of the different approaches one might take within the empirical study of judicial 
emotion.  
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TABLE 1 
Emotion-centred 
approach 
Investigate how a particular emotion or emotions (e.g., disgust, sadness, 
excitement) is or are experienced, expressed, or understood by judges. 
Emotional 
phenomenon 
approach 
Investigate the ways in which judges experience, express, or understand an 
emotion-related phenomenon (e.g., empathy, the affect heuristic, secondary 
trauma, emotional intelligence). 
Emotion 
management 
approach 
Investigate the ways in which judges seek to regulate the inner experience 
and/or outward expression of emotions and emotional phenomena, both their 
own and those of others. 
Interactional 
approach 
Investigate the ways in which judges’ emotions, emotional phenomena, and 
their management shape, and are shaped by, interactions with others (e.g., 
litigants, lawyers, colleagues, the public). 
Evaluative 
approach 
Investigate how others (e.g., litigants, lawyers, colleagues, the public) perceive 
and assess judges’ emotional experiences and expressions. 
Legal doctrine 
approach 
Investigate the ways in which legal doctrine is affected by how judges 
experience, express, or understand emotions and emotional phenomena (e.g., 
the impact of anger episodes on imposition of sanctions, how judicial disgust or 
concepts of regret inform rulings). 
Legal culture 
approach 
Investigate the ways in which judges’ experience, expression, understanding, or 
management of emotion shapes, and is shaped by, the legal culture (as defined 
by, inter alia, historical, national or local context) within which they are 
situated. 
Transformative 
approach 
Investigate whether, in what way, and how judges’ experience, expression, 
understanding, or management of emotions or emotional phenomena can be 
altered (e.g., through education or clinical intervention). 
Table 1. Analytical approaches to empirical study of judicial emotion. 
(Adapted from Maroney 2006, p. 126 tbl.1.)  
Any one of these approaches could be combined with others, be deployed 
comparatively, or explore variance over time; indeed, such multidimensionality is 
common and arguably preferable (Maroney 2006). Moreover, each approach will have 
differential goodness of fit with distinct research methods (Epstein and Martin 2014).2 
For example, qualitative interviews are relatively well-suited to get at how individual 
judges think about their emotions, their perceived impact and relevance (a question 
within an emotion-centred approach). Focus groups, clinical evaluation, and surveys 
are similarly optimal for capturing judges’ conceptions of their emotional experiences 
and associated phenomena, such as stress; consciously-engaged regulatory 
strategies (an emotion management question); and the emotional demeanours and 
displays they believe are required of them (a legal culture question). Courtroom 
observations are relatively better-suited to capture both external manifestations of 
emotion and interaction effects. Textual analysis of media representations can reveal 
evaluations of judges’ emotionally-infused behaviours. Experimentation enables 
causation claims, relevant to a legal doctrine approach (e.g., does induced anger 
increase judges’ punitivity?) or a transformative one (e.g., does a mentorship 
                                                 
2 This article does not seek to replicate the contents of the many excellent methodology texts that 
represent an invaluable resource for the judicial emotion researcher (Patton 2002, Singleton and Straits 
2005, Cane and Kritzer 2010, Epstein and Martin 2014). Nor does it engage deeply with research practices, 
such as the craft of field notes, interviewing, or content and statistical analyses (Weiss 1994, Emerson et 
al. 2011, Leavy 2014). Finally, it does not seek to encapsulate the vibrant empiricism of the affective 
sciences; not only is there no one clearly “right” set of theories about emotions, there is no one “right” 
way to research them (Ellsworth 1995). 
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program reduce the incidence and/or intensity of isolation?). At a more general level, 
quantitative methods – those that measure the distribution of finite options across 
known categories – are appropriate where the relevant phenomena are well-defined, 
whereas qualitative ones – those that capture the depth and detail of human 
experience and the meaning we make of it – are preferable when one seeks discovery 
of new conceptual categories rather than verification within previously established 
ones (Patton 2002, Luker 2008). Many researchers will find it useful not only to 
incorporate multiple conceptual approaches but to deploy mixed methods to capture 
data from multiple angles. Because it is difficult to determine how judges experience 
and express emotions in an environment that denies their relevance (Bergman Blix 
and Wettergren 2016), methodological care and creativity are key.  
4. Insights from extant empirical studies of judicial emotion 
Four major research programmes hold the centre of gravity within the empirical 
landscape. This section presents an evaluative synopsis of each, describing their 
approaches and methods, before presenting a similar (if shorter) analysis of other 
empirical projects.  
4.1. The Judicial Research Project (Flinders University, Australia) 
Over the course of the last two decades, Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack have 
worked to illuminate the reality of Australian judges’ work, including a focus on 
emotion. As they write in Performing Judicial Authority in the Lower Courts: 
As the courtroom, especially in the lower courts, entails very high levels of 
interdependence and a wide variety of social interactions, judicial emotions must 
necessarily be engaged. Emotional demands can include the frustration engendered 
in relation to time management, … the emotion, or lack thereof, displayed in different 
demeanours and the emotion work needed to achieve the required impersonal 
presentation in the face of emotionally challenging information and behaviour from 
others in court; and the manner of delivering the news in sentencing, both 
anticipating emotional responses from those in court as well as the emotional 
experience of formulating and delivering the sentencing decision. (Roach Anleu and 
Mack 2017, p. 173) 
As this excerpt shows, their research is emotion-centred, in that it presents evidence 
of what work-related emotional states, such as frustration, Australian judges 
experience; it also identifies triggers for those experiences, such as the processes of 
criminal sentencing. It examines emotional phenomena such as stress, asks how 
judges manage emotion so as to produce desired public demeanours, and explores 
the impacts of both interpersonal interactions and norms attending their legal culture. 
Commensurate with the range of its theoretical approaches, Roach Anleu and Mack’s 
research programme engages mixed methods to gather and analyse relevant data, 
including surveys, court observations, and interviews, each of which I briefly discuss 
below (Roach Anleu and Mack 2017).3 
None of these methods would have held a reasonable prospect of success, however, 
without the researchers’ close work with the Australian judiciary before, during, and 
after data collection. Judges are widely recognized to be a hard-to-reach group, both 
because of their elite status and because of the norms of confidentiality that shroud 
their behind-the-scenes work (Dobbin et al. 2001, Cowan et al. 2006). Relationship-
building is critical to participation and candour, particularly when asking judges to 
disclose sensitive information about their emotions (Roach Anleu and Mack 2017). 
                                                 
3 Commendably, Performing Judicial Authority in the Lower Courts includes a detailed methodological 
Appendix, which I recommend to those interested in reaching a level of granularity not attempted here. 
Many aspects of the study and its methodology also are discussed in Roach Anleu and Mack 2005, 2013, 
and in Roach Anleu et al. 2014. This portion of the article confines itself to examination of the research 
programme described in Performing Judicial Authority in the Lower Courts. The Judicial Research Project 
has pursued further empirical projects since that time, one of which is briefly discussed later in this article 
(Roach Anleu et al. 2016; see also Roach Anleu and Mack 2018). 
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Further, if the dominant legal culture holds the division between reason and emotion 
sacrosanct, judges may be “vigilant not to expose themselves or their groups to 
critique that could question their positions or privileges” by participating in research 
that challenges that division (Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2015, p. 690). Roach 
Anleu and Mack therefore cultivated relationships of trust with court organizations, 
leaders, and individual judges, through correspondence; in-person consultation; and 
presentations about project’s objectives, methods, and anticipated modes of 
dissemination. These efforts gave participants reason to buy into the enterprise and 
to trust assurances of confidentiality. Further, judges directly shaped the research – 
for example, through participation in and feedback on pilot phases – and shared in 
its fruits by having access to final analyses. Such time-consuming relationship work 
is a crucial element of a successful judicial emotion research project, particularly one 
of this scope. 
Surveys. Roach Anleu and Mack conducted three national surveys, including (but 
not limited to) items related to emotion. Construction of a probability sample or 
“sampling frame” often is a particularly challenging aspect of collecting judicial survey 
data (Dobbin et al. 2001, p. 291, Patton 2002, Farole 2009). However, given the 
relatively small number of Australian lower-court judges (≈1,000), the Judicial 
Emotion Project was in the enviable position of being able to survey the entire 
population of interest.4 They achieved a robust response rate of 50%, likely 
attributable to their relationship-building but also to structural assurances of 
anonymity. A pen-and-paper survey booklet was distributed via mail, with a prepaid 
mailback envelope with no return address; survey responses therefore were 
untraceable.5  
As the researchers explain, because “a questionnaire asks all participants to respond 
to the same questions, it enables collection of the same type of information directly 
from a large number of people, and the responses are directly comparable” (Roach 
Anleu and Mack, 2017, p. 177). This comparability advantage is particularly strong 
for quantitative data generated through closed-ended questions with a finite response 
options (e.g., Likert scales), provided they are well-calibrated to isolate and capture 
the items of interest consistently across respondents (Luker 2008). Roach Anleu and 
Mack made good use of closed questions to yield quantitative data on judges’ 
reported levels of stress, as well as the extent to which they value empathy and 
compassion, find their work emotionally draining, and experience work-related sleep 
loss (Roach Anleu and Mack 2017, pp. 64, 76 Tbls. 4.3, 4.5). Their inclusion of open-
ended questions, in response to which judges could write their own answers, yielded 
important qualitative data on how judges experienced those phenomena. Collecting 
both quantitative and qualitative data in this manner nicely combines comparability 
                                                 
4 By way of comparison, there are more than 30,000 state-court judges in the United States (Malega and 
Cohen 2013), in addition to ≈1,200 federal judges (Federal Judicial Center n.d.) and thousands more in 
other roles. A population of this size is difficult to survey, and results may have a more diminished claim 
on generalizability. For example, the 2019 National Judicial Stress and Resilience Survey, briefly discussed 
later, was disseminated across the U.S. through jurisdictional chiefs and other judicial networks. Though 
this technique leveraged judges’ familiarity with and trust in organizational allies, because the researchers 
did not themselves control the dissemination they cannot construct a response rate. Further, to heighten 
participants’ faith in anonymity, they did not collect any geographical data from respondents, even at the 
regional level. Faced with such trade-offs, other researchers have surveyed only particular sorts of judges, 
such as U.S. Immigration Judges (Lustig et al. 2008), or have identified a substantively interesting subset 
of judges and used statistical methods to create a representative sample within it (Dobbin et al. 2001). 
5 The Judicial Research Project’s last survey was administered in 2007, before online options were as 
prevalent as they are today. In today’s environment, judges might be more inclined to expect, trust, and 
regard as less burdensome an electronic survey administered through a reputable secured platform, such 
as REDCap (https://projectredcap.org/about/). However, the physical format enabled inclusion of 
materials – an introduction letter, information sheet, and letters of support – that might be less effectively 
processed, and less easily available for ongoing reference, in an electronic format. Every format choice 
carries benefits and disadvantages of which the survey researcher should be cognizant, so as to pick the 
best fit with the research questions and population rather than the convenience of the researcher (Dobbin 
et al., 2001; see also Farole 2009, describing a judicial survey offering the choice of responding online, 
via telephone, or by mail). 
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and flexibility, precision and nuance (Dobbin et al. 2001, Lustig et al. 2008). Finally, 
because Roach Anleu and Mack solicited demographic data, they were able to 
contextualize their data in light of important questions about the impact of variables 
like gender, age, and ancestry.  
This element of the Judicial Emotion Project is a sound example of surveys’ utility to 
the field. However, like all methods reliant on self-report, it is limited by the reality 
that judges who were willing to answer a survey and bare a sensitive aspect of the 
self may not be representative of the judicial population (Dobbin et al. 2001, Epstein 
and Martin 2014). 
Observations. Roach Anleu and Mack’s research programme also included a 
substantial court observation element. As compared to a probabilistic-sample survey, 
with observation what one loses in randomization and generalizability one gains in 
“quality of the description of nonrandom events” taking place in a natural setting 
(Blanck 1987, p. 339). In contrast to self-report through surveys or interviews, 
observation does not depend on the extent to which judges can and do “relate, 
account, explain, and render intelligible what they do to” a researcher; rather, it can 
illuminate their actual practices (van Oorschot and Mascini 2018, p. 207), including 
both usual and unusual events that might not be captured in official records (Roach 
Anleu and Mack 2017). The method therefore was particularly appropriate for 
examining interactions among judges, litigants, the public, and court personnel; 
judges’ public delivery of decisions; and demeanour. By systematically recording 
judges’ facial, verbal, and bodily displays, they gathered over 1,000 data points on 
demeanour alone, revealing a range of types: welcoming or good-natured; patient 
or courteous; routine, businesslike, or impersonal; impatient, rushed, inconsiderate, 
or bored; and harsh, condescending, or rude (Roach Anleu and Mack 2017, p. 119).  
As the researchers note, observation does not speak to “the motives, intentions, or 
experiences” of judges and others in the courtroom, and therefore does not 
substantiate “claims about the subjective intentions, purposes, or emotions” of those 
persons (Roach Anleu and Mack 2017, p. 191). It can, however, identify points of 
disjuncture between judges’ representations of those subjective states and how they 
actually act. Observations can capture occurrences that judges may not report, 
whether they are unnoticed, forgotten, taken for granted, or uncomfortable to admit. 
The demeanour data bear out this point. While in interviews Australian judges 
emphasized the importance of being welcoming and patient, such demeanour 
displays were uncommon in the observation sample: harsh, condescending and rude 
demeanour displays appeared at the same (low) rate as welcoming ones, and routine 
and impersonal displays were by far the most common of all (Roach Anleu and Mack 
2017, p. 121 Fig. 6.1).  
The nature of observation, though, forces choices and creates constraints (Patton 
2002); most obviously, given that the researcher must literally sit through events in 
real time, she must select a relatively small number of locations, judges, and matters 
to observe. In this instance, Roach Anleu and Mack focused only on proceedings 
involving the “general criminal list”, which forms “part of the work of virtually all 
magistrates at some point in their career” (Roach Anleu and Mack 2017, p. 187) and 
thus would speak to broader experiences across the judiciary. Rather than follow 
cases from start to finish, they observed whatever was on the list on a given day, 
creating a rich trove of cross-sectional snapshots. This choice reflected the need to 
make good use of researchers’ time, as virtually all observations required travel; 
fortunately, it also allowed them to develop a feel for the range of judges’ everyday 
experiences. They purposively sampled criminal-list proceedings in every state and 
territory and in a mix of urban, suburban, and rural communities. They also balanced 
observations of men and women, as well as judges of varying ages and tenures on 
the bench. These purposive sampling choices increased the time investment and 
logistical difficulty of the project, but enhanced Roach Anleu and Mack’s ability to 
make claims as to both generalizability and explanations for observed differences.  
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Observation also places a premium on the credibility, skill, and rigor of the observer, 
whose subjectivity is both the primary research tool and one of its primary limitations. 
Roach Anleu and Mack sought to leverage the former and minimize the latter by 
always using two observers; creating, through an iterative process, code sheets and 
instructions to standardize field notes; and immediately debriefing and reconciling 
those notes, while supplementing them with transcripts, recordings, and case files 
when available. They then analysed their field notes through rigorous qualitative 
analysis. These details make clear the heavy investment of strategy, time, and effort 
required to generate useful observation data, an investment the judicial emotion 
researcher should carefully consider and justify. 
Qualitative interviews. The third pillar of the Judicial Research Project, meant to 
triangulate surveys and observation so as to create a “sustained, multifaceted 
examination of the judiciary” (Roach Anleu and Mack 2017, p. 193), consisted of 38 
in-person, semi-structured, qualitative interviews of judges purposively sampled 
from all court levels, in both metropolitan and regional areas across Australia (Roach 
Anleu and Mack 2017, pp. 192-96). Relationship building was particularly important 
here, as interviews “with elites” raise “specific challenges and issues of access” 
(Roach Anleu and Mack 2017, p. 193, citing, inter alia, Bergman Blix and Wettergren 
2015). Interviews, ranging from half an hour to an hour and a half, were audio 
recorded, transcribed, and the transcripts analysed using the NVivo software 
package.  
While (like the surveys and observations) these interviews had a broader focus, 
emotions emerged as one consistent theme (Roach Anleu and Mack 2017, p.195). 
This is not surprising, as interviews “can reach emotional connections that are not as 
accessible” through other methods (Pugh 2013, p. 53). Interview data “give voice to 
the lived experience” of judging (Roach Anleu and Mack 2017, p. 11), yielding a 
richness that makes the emotional component of everyday judicial work palpable. 
There is an undeniable impact of hearing judges describe “seeing absolute misery 
passing in front of you day in, day out, month in, month out, year out” (Roach Anleu 
and Mack 2017, p. 19); the loneliness of serving in a “one magistrate country town” 
(Roach Anleu and Mack 2017, p. 43); and frustration with inability to solve the social 
difficulties in housing, employment, and welfare that underlie cases (Roach Anleu 
and Mack 2017, p. 54). One quote from one judge can capture an entire realm of 
theory: 
There’s often matters which bring tears to your eyes and I think that my role is that, 
my role isn’t to sit there and empathize and cry with them, my role is to be the face 
of the judiciary, the face of the community, that face that is acknowledging that grief 
without participating in it as such but also I don’t think there’s anything too wrong in 
showing that you’ve been affected by what’s happened. (Roach Anleu and Mack 2017, 
p. 67) 
This judge is wrestling with the dynamic between how he thinks he is supposed to 
feel and act under one cultural imperative – the cultural script of dispassion – and 
the potentially clashing moral imperative to acknowledge suffering. This internal 
struggle would be difficult to discover by other methods. Interviews are well-suited 
to uncovering the “distance between how someone feels and how they feel they ought 
to feel”, according to “cultural frames rendering some emotions more acceptable, 
expected or celebrated than others” (Pugh 2013, p. 51). This judge is also expressing 
a desire to be seen as a normal and caring member of the community (Maroney 
2016). The literal “veracity” of such narratives is not as important as the “deep 
truths” they reveal about how judges look at themselves and their experiences (Luker 
2008, p. 167). The Judicial Research Project’s interview data exemplify how this 
method can add life to theory.  
In sum, the Judicial Research Project presents an excellent example of what a well-
rounded, high-investment, long-term research programme can look like. It 
demonstrates the value of recruiting mixed methods, as each brings something 
Terry Maroney   Empirically investigating… 
 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 9, n. 5 (2019), 799-830 
ISSN: 2079-5971 808 
different to the table. Such triangulation can compensate for blind spots and confirm 
otherwise ambiguous signals (Scarduzio 2011, Roach Anleu and Mack 2017, Bergman 
Blix and Wettergren 2018). By weaving together both quantitative and qualitative 
data, the Project leverages the power of carefully-designed external instruments and 
of the researcher-as-instrument (Patton 2002). Examining the Project’s methods also 
demonstrates the impact that each research choice can have on the whole. For 
example, the choice to collect anonymous survey data on paper may have increased 
participation, but it also ensured that the data could not be linked across method. 
Roach Anleu and Mack could not, for example, compare any individual judge’s views 
as expressed in the survey to her observed behaviour, or to her interview narrative 
(Roach Anleu and Mack 2017, pp. 192, 193). Such tradeoffs, being inevitable, should 
be carefully considered when establishing the research design. 
4.2. Professional Emotions in Court (Uppsala University and Gothenburg 
University, Sweden) 
The second major extant research programme on judicial emotion is the work of Stina 
Bergman Blix and Åsa Wettergren, major aspects of which they present in 
Professional Emotions in Court: A Sociological Perspective (2018).6 They, too, 
focused on criminal cases in trial courts, and combined methods to investigate, 
among other emotional phenomena, the “silenced background emotions and tacitly 
habituated emotion management in the daily work” of the Swedish courts (Bergman 
Blix and Wettergren 2018, p. x). Interestingly, the two programmes diverged 
significantly at the basic level of analytic focus. While the Judicial Research Project 
focused only on judges but included emotion in a larger set of issues implicated in 
judges’ everyday work, Bergman Blix and Wettergren focused tightly on emotion but 
examined both judges and prosecutors, the two legal professionals within the 
Swedish criminal system tasked with embodying and projecting reasoned 
objectivity.7 Thus, though both research programmes squarely implicated the 
emotion-centred, emotional phenomenon, emotion management, interactional, and 
legal culture approaches, they came at those questions from a distinct analytic lens. 
In Sweden, the focus on emotion-within-legal-objectivity as opposed to emotion-
within-everyday-judicial-work (including how judges square emotion with objectivity) 
drove inclusion of prosecutors, who in addition to being of interest in their own right 
functioned as a built-in comparator set.8 
Even with this distinction, the research programmes have a great deal in common. 
Bergman Blix and Wettergren also invested heavily in relationship building – for 
example, early and ongoing contact with judicial leaders, and presenting the research 
to groups of potential participants. They also describe the critical role played by 
cultural insiders willing to negotiate entry; the first judge who agreed to be 
interviewed during the pilot phase “paved the way” for much that followed. As they 
write: “proposing previously unresearched topics, it is crucial to show that the topic 
(…) has resonance in the prospected field and that one has already established initial 
contacts” (Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2018, p. xi). They eventually gained the 
keys to the courthouse, “both literally and symbolically” (Bergman Blix and 
Wettergren 2018, p. xii), achieving “breakthrough” when a chief judge commended 
                                                 
6 Though Professional Emotions in Court does not include a methodological appendix, the authors helpfully 
pepper the text with call-out boxes titled How did we do it?, providing “relevant methodological information 
connected to the theoretical discussions” at that point in the narrative (Bergman Blix and Wettergren 
2018, p. 2). The choice to make the methods literally visible to the reader throughout was a creative way 
of encouraging regular integration of the what and the how. Many aspects of the study and its methodology 
also are discussed in Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2015, 2016, and in Roach Anleu et al. 2014. 
7 Lisa Flower has rounded out the narrative of Swedish legal professionals’ emotions and emotion work in 
the context of criminal cases in her dissertation work on defense attorneys, who – unlike judges and 
prosecutors – are required not to be objective but rather to be advocates (Flower 2018). Bergman Blix 
and Wettergren also interviewed 16 defense attorneys, though they were not the primary focus (Bergman 
Blix and Wettergren 2018, pp. 4, 32).  
8 I confine myself here to Bergman Blix and Wettergren’s work on judicial emotion. 
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the project to all judges in his jurisdiction (Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2015, p. 
700). Bergman Blix and Wettergren also deployed mixed methods, incorporating 
court observations (n=300, in four strategically selected courts in different locations 
across Sweden) and in-person, semi-structured, qualitative interviews (n=43). They 
applied to these methods a similar level of rigor (for example, with detailed code 
sheets) and gathered similarly rich individual narratives.  
However, rather than use surveys to round out the research programme, Bergman 
Blix and Wettergren used shadowing. Shadowing is a combination of observation and 
interview, in which the researcher accompanies subjects as they go about their work, 
with the opportunity to clarify understanding of, and learn the subject’s perspective 
on, what the researcher observes – for example, a courtroom interaction moments 
before, or a cryptic file (Scarduzio 2011, Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2015, van 
Oorschot and Mascini 2018). All the interviewed Swedish judges allowed the 
researchers to shadow them as well, enabling a rare look at the differences between 
judges’ public “frontstage” courtroom performances and their “backstage” behaviours 
in the office settings where they spend the bulk of their time. Being with judges 
during transitions between front and backstage not only threw the performative 
aspects of the former into relief, but also showed moments in which judges managed 
their emotions once entering a space in which they could let their guards down. For 
example, one judge engaged in an “immediate backstage ventilation of a strong 
emotion, first experienced but toned down front stage”, of being ashamed and 
embarrassed about the court’s failure to locate an interpreter, resulting in further 
delay in a proceeding already marked by tension and technological difficulties; this 
same judge had shown that her efforts to “pull [her]self together” before the hearing 
began by pouring herself some water and taking a moment (Bergman Blix and 
Wettergren 2018, 0.106, 109).  
Shadowing also proved particularly well-suited to illuminating “backgrounded” 
emotions, that is, those that remain outside of consciousness and orient the judge’s 
attention to and attitude about other objects, such as habituated feelings of 
professional pride (Barbalet 1998, Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2018, pp. 20, 38-
40). Self-report often fails to capture backgrounded emotional processes, including 
automatic emotion management (Compas et al. 2017). Shadowing, however, allows 
the researcher to prompt a subject to notice and name automatic processes by 
tethering the prompt to something immediate and concrete. Bergman Blix and 
Wettergren describe, for example, asking a judge why she had avoided an attorney’s 
gaze throughout a court session that had just ended; the judge thought about why 
and reported that she had controlled her gaze so as to forestall undesired 
communications with the defense, though she had not explicitly thought about the 
behaviour when engaging in it (Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2018, p. 20).  
Because the study’s three methods all were housed in specific courthouses, Bergman 
Blix and Wettergren were able to reach a deep level of analysis as to individual 
judges, given the multiple points and types of contact. They dove deep into four sites, 
two urban and two suburban, minimizing travel (a factor made possible by the 
relatively few areas of population density in Sweden, and their relative proximity to 
one another, as compared to Australia) and maximizing consistent time in the 
building. What they lost by not collecting quantitative data across a probabilistic 
sample they gained in the texture and nuance of the deep dive. At the same time, 
their identification of consistent themes across the deep dives provides an alternative 
basis for claims of generalizability.  
Another distinctive aspect of Bergman Blix and Wettergren’s work is the extent to 
which they are explicitly reflexive about their own emotions. They discuss, for 
example, the “feelings of low self-worth, despondency, and resentment” that 
attended being rejected, ignored, or disrespected by judges in the course of their 
study, and the “strong feelings of pleasure” that attended their eventual “recognition 
and acceptance from elites” (Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2015, p. 690). Rather 
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than seek to set their emotional processes aside, they examined them to interrogate 
possible impacts on their analysis – and, at a deeper level, as elements of that 
analysis. As they write: 
To be able to better focus our attention and follow the fluctuation of emotional 
intensity, we also employed ‘emotional participation’, a method in which our own 
emotions were used as a tool to generate reflections and insights relative to the 
situations and persons observed. (Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2018, p. 21) 
Treating researcher reactions as “an information source into the emotional processes 
in the field” is consistent with the feelings-as-information theory (Schwarz 2012); at 
the same time, it is important to surface and interrogate those reactions, as they are 
not unfailingly accurate (Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2018, p. 21).  
In sum, the work of Bergman Blix and Wettergren serves as another excellent 
example of a well-rounded, high-investment, long-term research programme, one 
reflecting different methodological choices that yielded equally valuable data on 
judicial emotion. 
4.3. The Judicial Emotion Project (Terry Maroney, Vanderbilt University, USA)  
A third project is my own, focused on judges in the United States. The Judicial 
Emotion Project builds on my core theoretical work on judicial emotion, particularly 
emotional experience and its regulation (Maroney 2011a, 2011b, 2012). It has 
incorporated empirical investigation only in the last several years, and over time 
aspires to touch on each of my taxonomy’s theoretical approaches.9 While grounded 
in the same core approaches evidenced in the previously-described research 
programmes, this one involves a deeper investigation of the impact of emotion and 
emotional phenomena (for example, stress and isolation) on judges’ personal well-
being and professional performance (emotion-centred, emotional phenomenon, and 
legal doctrine). It also introduces a novel investigation of how judges might increase 
their facility in identifying, understanding, and regulating emotion at work 
(transformative).  
This programme, too, places a premium on relationship-building, though that effort 
has taken a slightly different shape. The front line of that relationship-building has 
been frequent presentations about judicial emotion – again, drawing on my 
theoretical work – through seminars and conferences organized by court systems and 
judicial educational entities. I have cultivated a particularly close partnership with the 
Federal Judicial Center, the governmental agency charged with research and 
education for the federal judicial branch, in collaboration with which I regularly 
present content to both trial and appellate judges. Over the course of many years, 
such presentations have yielded valuable relationships with specific courts and 
individual judges. These are my cultural insiders, invested in the issues and the 
programme’s success, on whom I now rely for access. Further, these educational 
seminars and the deep conversations that they occasion have functioned as an 
ongoing, nationwide focus group through which hundreds of judges continually 
educate me about their experiences and concerns, education I now pour directly into 
the research design. My educational work thus is not primarily a recruitment tool, 
though it now sometimes serves that function; instead, the enthusiasm with which 
judges have received the educational content has opened the door to pursuing 
empirical investigation. It also has deeply shaped the empiricism itself. 
The core method at this stage in the Judicial Emotion Project’s development is in-
person, semi-structured qualitative interviews, each averaging two hours, with Article 
III U.S. federal judges from the trial and appellate courts.10 Focusing on this sample 
                                                 
9 The ambition of the project mirrors to no small degree that now being pursued by the Judicial Research 
Project, as articulated in Roach Anleu et al. 2016, p. 65.  
10 “Article III” judges are the subset of federal judges authorized under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, 
as distinguished from other federally-employed judges whose authority derives from a different source 
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has a number of strategic advantages. A primary advantage is access, as many of 
my strongest relationships are within the federal judiciary; and as the federal 
judiciary is orders of magnitude smaller (n≈1,200) than the state-court bench 
(n>30,000), each relationship carries relatively more weight. A federal sample also 
eliminates many potential sources of variation for which any analysis would have to 
account, such as the need to stand for election, common in the states but not required 
of Article III judges, all of whom enjoy life tenure. These judges also share a simple, 
three-tier hierarchy; are bound by a common corpus of operative law; and (with 
limited exceptions) are generalists, whereas other judges tend to be specialized (for 
example, in family, civil, or criminal dockets). This relative uniformity, combined with 
the relatively small total population, amplifies the extent to which the interview data 
might illuminate phenomena touching federal judges as a whole. That concern also 
motivates purposive sampling for diversity, including by reference to sex, gender, 
race, ethnicity, age, and sexual orientation, each of which would be expected to affect 
the phenomena of interest; appointment by a Republican and Democratic president, 
a variable that draws outsize attention in empirical studies of U.S. federal judges, 
and to which any study therefore is wise to attend; and geography, given the 
enormity of the country, deep social and cultural differences between regions, and 
extreme variations in population density.  
Some factors that recommend this sample for the initial research wave, however, 
also points to the importance of expanding beyond it in subsequent ones. Elections 
create job insecurity and vulnerability to public pressure (Miller et al. 2018), factors 
that may create particularly interesting interactional effects – for example, 
heightening judges’ attention to how they think any emotional displays will be 
evaluated by the broader public, which may alter how they manage those displays – 
as well as impacts on wellbeing, such as stress. The emotional processes and 
challenges attending sitting daily in a crowded, low-resourced family-court docket 
may be quite different than those facing a well-resourced federal trial judge with a 
busy, but well-ordered, generalist docket in which every emotionally charged case – 
for example, a child pornography sentencing (named by every interview participant 
to date) – is outnumbered by relatively unemotional ones (such as patent disputes). 
Fortunately, many federal judges, including one-third of the interview sample to date, 
previously served in the state courts; to a surprising degree, then, the federal sample 
has proven a valuable source of embedded comparison data. Still, the Judicial 
Emotion Project certainly will want to include interviews with sitting state-court 
judges, a move that will tee up difficult sampling choices. 
Substantively, the interviews—which are recorded and transcribed, and the 
transcripts then analysed qualitatively in the Dedoose software platform, using two 
researchers who code blind to the other and then reconcile coding differences in 
person11 – are yielding narrative data as rich and detailed as those from Sweden and 
Australia. Even at this still-early juncture, though, interesting differences are 
emerging. The first reflects the U.S. cultural context. For example, the unusually 
punitive system of criminal justice in the U.S., particularly the ubiquity of high 
mandatory minimum sentences, appears to be a common source of challenge. This 
judge, for example, described a case in which a defendant’s behaviour stemmed from 
a difficult background but was facing an extreme sentence: 
Those are the [cases] where I just want to fix society, and I feel horrible because I 
am bound to a certain set of laws that are overly punitive. 
Numerous judges of diverse backgrounds have articulated a painful, frustrating sense 
of powerlessness in similar scenarios. While judicial frustration is ubiquitous, these 
data show a way in which its specific causes are not. 
                                                 
and who have more limited terms of office and substantive jurisdiction (e.g., Magistrate, Immigration, and 
Bankruptcy Judges). By December 2019, interview data will have been collected with 25 judges.  
11 This dialogic process maximizes ability to identify and define emergent categories and cultivates 
interrater reliability. 
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Other emerging differences stem from the Judicial Emotion Project’s strong 
theoretical grounding in psychology. Because the Project examines emotion and its 
management at work, it necessarily draws on sociological questions and constructs. 
My primary theoretical grounding, however, is in affective psychology, and my 
current collaborators work with Vanderbilt’s Qualitative Research Core, housed in the 
Psychology department. One way in which this grounding manifests is in the detailed 
code book we have developed, by which we characterize demarcated units of 
narrative within an interview transcript. The code book includes many items drawn 
from affective psychology, such as discrete emotion states (e.g. relief, regret, and 
sadness) and known regulatory strategies (e.g. verbal suppression and social 
sharing). The primacy of such items also is reflected in many questions in the 
interview protocol, such as “Can you tell me about a time you got angry at work?”, 
“when you felt angry, did you do anything in particular to try and cope with that 
feeling?”, and “do you talk with other judges about the emotionally challenging 
aspects of your job?”. The interview dialogue, not surprisingly, therefore tends to 
have a strong psychological cast. Some judges joke about being “on the couch”; 
commonly, they remark on being pleasantly surprised by the rare chance to discuss 
their emotions. In coding, we often place something a judge reports into a 
psychological category. For example, this judge is describing her work on an 
alternative court docket that aims to help troubled defendants successfully re-enter 
society, and the pain she feels when some predictably fail:  
I can try to give them as many tools as I possibly can, and resources to make good 
decisions, and have good things happen, but I can't control them. And really focus 
back on what my role is, and what my job is, and that it's very limited and it's really 
to give people tools and resources, and then let them take it from there, and 
remember that, you know, that all of our participants have agency. And it's their 
agency, not mine, and you really think about that, and then get comfortable with 
that idea. 
We identify this judge as engaging in cognitive reappraisal, in which she reframes 
the meaning or attributes of a situation so as to change its emotional content and 
impact (Maroney and Gross 2014). Here, she is reframing her efforts not as a failure, 
but as a principled exercise of her authority, and further reframing the source of the 
bad outcome as choices for which she is not responsible and over which she has no 
power. Such reappraisal does not eliminate the emotion she reports, but appears to 
change it, from one of regret or guilt (focused on her perceived shortcomings) to one 
of sadness (focused on the defendant’s difficult situation and poor choices), a more 
comfortable emotional stance if still an unpleasant one. This example shows how a 
different theoretical orientation drives a different operationalization of the interview 
method, with discernible impacts on the data those interviews generate and how they 
are analysed. 
Developing and future aspects of the Judicial Emotion Project – in addition to 
development of a state-court interview sample – may be succinctly described. We 
have just begun an investigation of the “judicial wellness” movement, growing rapidly 
in the US but also in Australia and Canada. In the US, both state and federal courts 
have expressed alarm that physical and emotional impairment can harm ability to 
fulfill judicial duties (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 2015). This trend 
includes a proliferation of wellness guides and trainings; expansion of lawyers’ 
assistance programs to judges; and direct provision of mental health services (Fogel 
2016, Buchanan 2017, Smith 2017). We hope to learn what motivates that 
movement, what its leaders identify as the greatest threats to judges’ emotional 
wellness, what impacts they believe emotional dysfunction has on judges’ health and 
job performance, and the steps they are taking in response. That study will combine 
qualitative data from two sources: semi-structured interviews with judges, 
administrators, research professionals, and attorneys working to promote judicial 
wellness, and textual analysis of the materials judicial-wellness leaders generate, 
such as written and video wellness guides. We hope also to develop a survey 
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instrument, informed by the federal-judge interview study, any state-court interview 
sample, and the wellness study. This survey may draw on the 2019 National Judicial 
Stress and Resilience Survey, seeking to replicate it with a federal sample (<3% of 
its respondents were federal judges) and expand its scope to broader aspects of 
judicial emotion. Finally, I plan to study whether and under what conditions judges 
might learn through an educational module to grow their emotion-regulation 
capacity, ideally tying any such growth to concrete outcomes, such as self-reported 
instances of isolation, burnout, or inappropriate emotional displays. Such a study 
would draw on the intensive seminars I have co-designed and co-direct for mid-
career federal judges. 
In sum, the Judicial Emotion Project models a somewhat different approach than the 
Australian and Swedish examples on which it builds, even as it asks many of the 
same questions and uses some of the same methods, demonstrating some of the 
possibilities for variation based on local conditions and theoretical orientation.  
4.4. JUSTEMOTIONS (Uppsala University, Sweden; Strathclyde University, 
Scotland; Research Institute on the Judicial System of the National Research 
Council of Italy; Vanderbilt University, USA) 
The fourth major judicial emotion empirical research programme is the youngest. 
Under the leadership of Stina Bergman Blix is JUSTEMOTIONS: The Construction of 
Objectivity: An international perspective on the emotive-cognitive process of judicial 
decision-making. The JUSTEMOTIONS project “investigates how objectivity is 
constructed in different legal systems by comparing legal decision-making in four 
countries” (https://www.soc.uu.se/research/justemotions/). It proceeds from a 
similar theoretical foundation as Bergman Blix’s prior collaborative work with 
Wettergren (also a collaborator here), grounded in the notions that for both judges 
and prosecutors, “objective decision-making relies on emotional information”, and 
that these professionals’ “own emotional experiences influence” their decision-
making, for example, attributions of blame. It therefore embraces a similar cluster 
of theoretical approaches (emotion-centred, emotional phenomenon, legal culture, 
interactive) but adds a legal doctrine component. Significantly, it also adds a 
comparative element. Over a five-year term an international team is performing 
parallel research in Sweden, Scotland, the US and Italy, as these 
countries represent different legal systems (common and civil criminal law) and vary 
in emotional expressiveness (e.g. the Swedish subtle emotional regime versus the 
more expressive Italian). By contrasting decisions of three crime types – fraud, 
domestic abuse, and homicide – in different legal instances and in different countries, 
we will be able to identify and describe common features of the decision-making 
process based on actual practice. 
In each country, a postdoctoral researcher will conduct fieldwork consisting of 
observations, shadowing, and interviews, with the guidance of a locally-based 
affiliated researcher to facilitate access and orient the junior scholar to local practice.  
JUSTEMOTIONS represents the first explicitly comparative study of judicial emotion. 
Comparative work “helps refine the approach to a topic of inquiry by raising new 
conceptual and research questions and, on that basis, sharpening understanding of 
that topic” (Roach Anleu et al. 2016, p. 60). Its value in the judicial emotion context 
can easily be gleaned by comparing Bergman Blix and Wettergren’s prior work with 
that of Roach Anleu and Mack. While the latter found multiple instances of incongruity 
between judicial emotional scripts and Australian judges’ actual behaviour in court, 
in Sweden the two were largely congruent, with “privileged deviance” (Scarduzio 
2011, p. 295) limited to extremely subtle actions such as placing a pen down on the 
table, which the researchers came to understand as a common expression of a 
judge’s anger or irritation (Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2016). This emotion signal 
would have been utterly lost in a different cultural context. Similarly, the many overt 
and public expressions of judicial anger that I have documented in the US (Maroney 
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2012), and that form the basis of many US judicial disciplinary proceedings (Roach 
Anleu et al. 2016), would be extraordinary in Sweden. Such contrasts make clear the 
impact of distinct cultural scripts, such as the muted display rules of Swedish courts, 
a reality that requires the emotion researcher to attend closely to culturally specific 
“emotional regimes” (Bergman Blix and Wettergren 2016, p. 32), as the 
JUSTEMOTIONS project allows us to do.12 
A final methodological innovation is to follow cases from start to finish, ideally from 
the moment a complaint lands in a local prosecutor’s office until the termination of 
any direct appeals. This case-tracking method, unlike a daily-snapshot one, will 
capture a smaller universe of cases but provide greater depth within them, providing 
a unique opportunity to identify emotional influences in multiple actors’ decision-
making over time.  
4.5. Other important empirical research on judicial emotion: a roundup 
The previously-described efforts all fit within an ongoing, cohesive research 
programme. However, important empirical work has been and is being generated 
outside of such parameters. I present them here—again, with a focus on approach 
and methods, rather than on substantive findings—to situate them within the larger 
project of which they form a part, whether the investigators are aware of that project 
or not. While most such studies embrace a combination of theoretical approaches, I 
group them according to their centre of gravity. 
4.5.1 Emotion-centred, emotional phenomenon, and emotion management 
This cluster represents the bulk of extant research.  
Emotional aspects of good judging. Two recent studies examine judicial concepts 
of “good judging”, including its emotional concomitants. In the first, the Federal 
Judicial Center (FJC) compiled a single working group of federal judges, judicial 
clerks, and FJC staff to debate and formulate a comprehensive scheme of the range 
of competencies required of U.S. federal judges (FJC 2018). The method was simple: 
the group met multiple times, debated, drafted, and released a report. That report 
identifies “emotional intelligence” as a core judicial attribute, and links a number of 
other competencies to reduced stress and increased emotional well-being, happiness, 
and job satisfaction (FJC 2018, p. 29). The simplicity of the method contrasts with 
the length and detail of the report. While it is subdivided into multiple competency 
headings, it consists primarily of lists, with many competencies listing similar judicial 
attributes. Further, it makes a number of factual statements that it does not seek to 
prove, such as the assertion that when “judges practice collegiality” they “experience 
emotional well-being and reduced stress” (FJC 2018, p. 25). Nonetheless, the report 
is a valuable starting point, representing a collection of judicial leaders’ beliefs. A 
qualitative researcher might perform textual analysis to discern, group, and analyse 
the report’s emotional themes to generate a tighter framework; other judicial 
emotion researchers might comb the document for the empirically testable assertions 
it tees up.  
The second study, by the Judicial Excellence Project of the National Center for State 
Courts (NCSC), took on a similar question and applied to it a more complex 
methodological design, and as would be expected yielded a more elegant set of 
findings. NCSC sought to identify the “general types of knowledge, skills, abilities, 
and other characteristics that judges themselves believe are important to judicial 
                                                 
12 A similar point about cultural situatedness is made by Johansen (2018). She conducted extensive 
observational research in Danish courtrooms, combined with judicial interviews. Her study concerned 
Danish judges’ evaluations of criminal defendants’ emotions – for example, remorsefulness – based on 
courtroom behaviours. As she notes, that examination is deeply influenced by the judges’ cultural lenses; 
further, they were irritated by defendants’ perceived failures to follow emotional scripts. See also Bosma 
2019, for an experimentally-based examination of how Dutch judges evaluate crime victims’ emotions. 
Both researchers ask how judges see the emotions of others, but future studies could reverse the direction 
of observation or ask judges to self-evaluate. 
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excellence” (NCSC 2017, p. 1; see also Elek 2019 – this volume). Researchers 
partnered with court leaders in Illinois, who nominated judges as exemplars of 
judicial excellence. They interviewed a subset of these “excellent” judges; from those 
interviews developed a preliminary conceptual framework; tested it with focus groups 
of the remaining “excellent” judges; revised the framework; and surveyed the focus-
group participants about the revisions. Focus groups, while vulnerable to difficult 
group dynamics, are a relatively fast and cost-effective way to test ideas and identify 
themes for further research (Farole 2009), ideally yielding “high-quality data in a 
social context where people can consider their own views in the context of the views 
of others” (Patton 2002, p. 386). NCSC further triangulated their focus group data 
by surveying the interviewees about the post-focus-group framework.13 The final 
framework identified nine elements of judicial excellence, organized within three 
distinct clusters, representing a significant step forward in how excellence – the 
elusive goal of all judicial education programming – might be understood, and thus 
pursued. 
This iterative process yielded a number of emotion-relevant findings, among them 
that respected judges understand judicial excellence to require displays of empathy, 
compassion, and generosity; believe active engagement in working toward justice 
can buffer against complacency or burnout; and think that truly excellent judges care 
for their physical and psychological well-being, including by learning to 
“‘compartmentalize’” and ‘let go’ of work at the end of the day, and after resolution 
of a difficult case” (NCSC 2017, p. 7). The report also reflects judicial leaders’ view 
that their peers vary greatly on such emotional skills – indeed, that emotion is among 
the sites of greatest variance. Given the research design, particularly its limitation to 
a single state, NCSC does not claim to have identified a widespread view among U.S. 
judges, nor does it claim to describe widespread judicial practice. However, the data 
cohere nicely to show what well-regarded U.S. state-court judges believe to be best 
practices for judicial emotion and its effective management. It also identifies a 
perceived need for enhanced training and supports around judicial emotion, which 
could justify greater allocation of research funding to find ways to meet that need.  
Accidental findings on judicial emotion. Schuster and Propen (2010) stumbled 
on rich judicial-emotion data when conducting interviews (and associated court 
observations) about how judges evaluate victims’ emotionality when delivering victim 
impact statements. In that process they also learned that the Minnesota state-court 
judges with whom they spoke had their own emotional experiences, which they 
expended effort to manage. One of their 28 judicial interviewees described thinking 
he was going to cry while listening to an impact statement, but suppressing that 
behaviour because to maintain authority “you are not supposed to cry on the bench” 
(Schuster and Propen 2010, p. 89). Other judges spoke of feeling ground down by 
their work, as if working in a “factory” designed “to strip away emotions”, leading the 
authors to conclude that “the emotional work to maintain an objective demeanor may 
lead to emotional detachment” (Schuster and Propen 2010, p. 89). Such an 
accidental find is not a method for which a researcher can plan, but it is reminder of 
the power of qualitative research to reveal unexpected categories of knowledge, and 
the importance of keeping an open mind to unexpected findings.  
Judicial wellness. Judges’ unique occupational stressors can “dampen both 
professional performance and personal happiness” (Chamberlain and Richardson 
2013, p. 270), but there is “a serious and dangerous lack of research” into both 
causes and consequences (Bornstein et al. 2013, p. 304). It is this gap that the 
Judicial Emotion Project aims to help fill. However, some groundwork has been laid.  
A preliminary study administered standardized tests of personality type and stress 
symptoms at judicial workshops around the U.S., hypothesizing a link between the 
                                                 
13 In all, the Judicial Excellence Project clocked 100 interview hours with 81 judges, 24 focus-group hours 
with 24 judges divided into 4 groups, and two years of labour. Their methods are detailed in a Technical 
Appendix.  
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two (Showalter and Martel 1985); a follow-up piloted a new measure, the Judicial 
Stress Inventory, to do the same (Eells and Showalter 1994), but the preliminary 
findings have not been developed further. A mixed-methods study of Romanian 
magistrates suggested high levels of work-related stress; interestingly, that study 
identified physical workplace conditions, such as inadequate lighting, as a primary 
source (Ciocoiu et al. 2010). A semi-structured interview study conducted by 
psychologists identified symptoms of secondary traumatic stress in a non-clinical 
sample of nine U.S. state-court judges (Chamberlain and Miller 2009; see also 
Bremer 2002). Clinical psychologist Isaiah Zimmerman paints a troublesome picture 
of isolation (Zimmerman 2000) and stress (Zimmerman 1981) among the judges he 
has treated, hypothesizing that judges experience high levels of distress associated 
with a combination of “social isolation”, “chronic overwork”, and particular personality 
profiles (Zimmerman 2000, p. 5). Finally, a web-based survey of U.S. Immigration 
Judges showed “significant symptoms” of trauma and burnout, as indicated by the 
Secondary Trauma Stress Scale and the Copenhagen Burnout Inventory, particularly 
among women (Lustig et al. 2008). In addition to gathering quantitative data on 
stress and burnout, that survey solicited a free response to the question “Please let 
us know anything else that would help explain the occupational challenges faced by 
immigration judges” (Lustig et al. 2008, p. 60). More than half of the respondents 
used that space to chronicle caseload pressures, poor infrastructure, emotional 
exhaustion, and the impact of hearing on a daily basis “the worst of the worst that 
has ever happened to any human being” (Lustig et al. 2008, p. 74). 
These studies are useful in identifying potential contributors to, and moderators of, 
judicial stress (Eells and Showalter 1994, p. 82). However, they coexist with other 
data indicating relatively high levels of judicial job satisfaction, at least in some places 
(Roach Anleu and Mack 2017); indeed, even the surveyed U.S. Immigration Judges 
reported non-negligible levels of job satisfaction (Lustig et al. 2008, p. 74). Studies 
with clinical samples, like Zimmerman’s, indicate that some judges are deeply and 
negatively affected by stress and isolation, but do not inform us about the extent to 
which the same is true more generally. Most of these studies are exploratory, small, 
or both; hence Bornstein et al.’s call for greater investment in such research.  
Fortunately, this empirical space is filling in at increasing speed. In Australia, several 
highly-publicized judicial suicides accelerated a call for research to which Schrever, 
Hulbert and Sourdin responded, designing a mixed-methods study to “consider how 
judicial stress can be characterized, quantified, and, where required, addressed” 
(Schrever et al. 2019, p. 142).14 Their methodology section strikes by-now-familiar 
notes on relationship building, trust, and confidentiality. They identified judicial 
leaders, gave presentations at five target courts, and pledged to keep confidential 
both judges’ individual identities and the courts’ name and location (a step also taken 
by Bergman Blix and Wettergren). Judges could choose to participate in up to three 
stages: a short survey on stress; a longer survey on mental health literacy, burnout, 
secondary trauma, and alcohol use; and a semi-structured interview going into 
greater depth on all these topics. The tiered approach was responsive to “judicial 
officers’ general ‘time poverty’”, a strategy to increase participation at some level by 
those who would not participate at all were only the most time-consuming options 
available (Schrever et al. 2019, p. 143). Judges could choose to respond to the 
surveys on paper, with stamped mailback envelopes, or online through Qualtrics. The 
short survey enjoyed a 67% response rate; further, over 80% of those judges went 
on to respond to the second survey, and 40% elected also to sit for an interview. 
Consistent with the other interview studies, these interviews were audio-recorded, 
transcribed, and analysed for recurrent themes. 
Interestingly, surveyed judges could choose to receive “personalised feedback”. This 
novel option was meant to balance the need to offer anonymity against the benefits 
                                                 
14 Schrever and co-authors provide citations to every study they believe to have been published on judicial 
stress (numbering 15, including all those described above) (Schrever et al. 2019, p. 142 n. 3). 
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of “notifying and supporting participants when scores indicated psychological 
distress”, an assessment that was possible given the surveys’ incorporation of “widely 
used screening tools for mental health concerns”, such as the Depression, Anxiety 
and Stress Scales 21 (DASS-21) (Schrever et al. 2019, p. 143).15 Nearly half of the 
152 survey respondents chose to “voluntarily forsake their anonymity” and receive 
that feedback through an emailed, password-protected document which, if any scores 
were in the high to severe range, recommended seeking support from provided 
resources.  
Thus far, Schrever and her colleagues have analysed and published only the “primary 
analysis of the quantitative survey data – that is, descriptive statistics and normative 
comparisons across the various measures of stress and wellbeing” (Schrever et al. 
2019, p. 153). That analysis shows the following. Like lawyers, judges report elevated 
psychological distress and problematic alcohol use; symptoms of burnout and 
secondary trauma are prominent features of the judicial stress experience; and 
judges’ rates of depressive and anxious symptoms are relatively low, in contrast to 
the elevated levels found in lawyers. Together, “the findings reveal a judicial system 
not yet in mental health crisis, but under considerable stress” (Schrever et al. 2019, 
p. 167). As the authors acknowledge, their methodology has limits. Their research 
locations might be somehow unrepresentative, though they included every level of 
court; all self-report is vulnerable to biases, including social desirability bias; judges 
may lack insight into the frequency and intensity of their stress, a particular danger 
given the “stress denying culture of the Australian judiciary”; and they may have 
failed to reach the “most acutely unwell” judges (Schrever et al. 2019, p. 166). Still, 
this study – even at this first stage – represents a sea change in the level of 
disciplined scrutiny of judicial stress and trauma. 
In the United States, the Coalition of Lawyer Assistance Programs (COLAP) has just 
released preliminary results of its 2019 National Judicial Stress and Resilience 
Survey; manuscripts are forthcoming.16 Substantive overlap with the Australian 
Wellbeing Survey is considerable, including use of psychometric instruments such as 
the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT); however, this survey also 
examines resiliency practices, a positive psychology focus that Scherer et al. 
acknowledged would be an important next step (Schrever et al. 2019, p. 167). A 
number of methodological distinctions are notable. After two pilot phases and 
extensive relationship-building, COLAP attempted to reach a national sample 
including state and federal judges with a novel distribution model: a respected 
national judicial education organization (the National Judicial College) and state 
Lawyers Assistance Programs, with cooperation from state courts’ chief justices, sent 
a link to the anonymous online survey to judges in their purview. The approach paid 
off with a large gross number of responses (n=1034). The distributed dissemination 
mechanism, however, prevents calculation of a response rate, and very low 
participation by federal judges (2.1%) indicates that the mechanism was not 
successful in reaching all sectors of the U.S. judiciary. COLAP also opted to increase 
the strength of its anonymity signal by not collecting any geographical identification. 
Still, it remains the largest such survey to date, and it achieved gender balance and 
robust participation from both trial and appellate judges in a range of urban, rural, 
and suburban areas. Substantively, measures of sources of stress, effects of stress, 
and alcohol had high internal consistency/reliability (.80-.90+), while resiliency 
measures were more varied. 
Among the survey team’s early findings are that common sources of stress include 
the weight of decision-making, caseloads, unprepared lawyers and pro se litigants; 
security concerns were less implicated, though some earlier studies suggested the 
opposite might be true. Stress effects included fatigue, sleep disturbance, attentional 
                                                 
15 Each of the psychometric instruments used is identified at Schrever et al. 2019, p. 146, Tbl.2. 
16 One of the lead researchers, Dr. David Swenson, provided me with a copy of the presentation made at 
the Coalition of Lawyer Assistance Programs’ National Conference in Austin, Texas on September 25, 2019. 
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problems, and rumination. As in the Australian study, levels of alcohol dependence, 
depression/anxiety, and suicidal ideation were lower than might have been feared. 
And in the novel area of resilience, the COLAP survey found a gap between desired 
and actual levels of resiliency-promoting behaviours, with the gap smallest for 
healthy eating and physical exercise, and largest for asking for peer support; 
relaxation (e.g., yoga); mindful practices; and seeking out personally meaningful 
interactions with colleagues. Of course, the same concerns about self-report biases, 
failure to reach the most unwell judges, and the like obtain to this study as well, and 
the extent to which these judges are a representative sample on multiple levels is 
unknowable. Still, it too represents a sea change, the baseline from which future 
research will grow.  
All the wellness studies, it should be noted, have a transformational element, whether 
as subtext or writ large, whether distal or proximate. Indeed, the Australian study 
incorporated a direct mechanism for helping judges access support and care. The 
COLAP survey explicitly positions its work as helping set the agenda for judicial 
wellness commissions, articulating justification for expanding remedial wellness 
options for judges subject to disciplinary complaints, and providing material with 
which to educate judges about wellness and how to achieve it. Interventions to 
increase skill in emotion management have proven effective in improving medical 
professionals’ wellbeing and performance, but have not been tested with judges 
(Grewal and Davidson 2008, Granek et al. 2012, Shayne and Quill 2012, Cameron et 
al. 2013). These studies are likely to motivate such work. 
4.5.2. Legal doctrine 
The two studies described in this cluster are creative and thought-provoking. First, 
inspired by a public debate over whether a Supreme Court Justice – or any judge – 
ought to display a robust capacity for empathy, political scientists Adam Glynn and 
Maya Sen examined whether the experience of raising daughters might affect judges’ 
rulings in cases involving women’s rights (Glynn and Sen 2014). They made inventive 
use of on-the-shelf data gathered for other purposes (Singleton and Straits 2005), 
ranging from Who’s Who in American Law to a dataset created by other researchers 
investigating judicial partisanship, to construct a new data set on U.S. federal judges’ 
families. They then constructed a dataset tallying the outcome votes of judges of the 
U.S. Courts of Appeal in cases involving gender issues, such as sex-based 
employment discrimination cases. Using statistical analyses, Glynn and Sen showed 
that “judges with at least one daughter” vote in a more “feminist” fashion “on gender 
issues than judges with sons”, a robust effect driven by “Republican male appointees” 
who otherwise would be expected to be relatively hostile to such claims (Glynn and 
Sen 2014, p. 38). They argued that the “daughter effect” (Glynn and Sen 2014, p. 
51) – which does not generally “liberalize” judges, showing its impact only in gender-
relevant cases – is most plausibly explained by affective ties, as follows. Male judges 
learn about women’s challenges through having daughters; the learning journey is 
most significant for conservative male judges, who have the furthest distance to 
travel; and love makes this learning particularly meaningful. Thus, Glynn and Sen 
argue that having a daughter cultivates empathy in both its cognitive and emotional 
dimensions, and that such empathy makes a difference in how judges decide cases.  
The rigor of Glynn and Sen’s statistical methods enables them to make plausible 
arguments about causation and to mount arguments against rival explanations, such 
as preference realignment. However, the strength of their findings is reliant on the 
validity and reliability of their measures, and (as is typical with such a quantitative 
study) there is plenty of room to quibble with their choices. Most pointedly, much 
rides on their decisions as to what counted as a gender-relevant case, for example, 
the choice to exclude cases involving male plaintiffs, or claims about LGBT rights, 
and as to what sort of vote counted as “(1) antifeminist or (2) partially or entirely 
feminist” (Glynn and Sen 2014, p. 43). The latter is a relatively crude measure: it 
captures whether the vote was for or against a claim in favour of a female employee, 
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or in favour of expanding or restricting abortion access, but cannot capture why any 
given judge voted as they did. Still, this study makes an important contribution to 
our understanding of how personal experience and affective ties might influence 
judicial behaviour and decision making. 
Second, in a rare example of experimentation involving judges, Wistrich, Rachlinski 
and Guthrie – a judge, a law-and-psychology professor, and a law professor – 
similarly explored whether and how affect might influence legal rulings (Wistrich et 
al. 2015). Some have argued that experimentation is a “luxury” that most empirical 
legal researchers are unable to afford (Epstein and Martin 2014, p. 7). Moreover, in 
no small part because of judges’ elite status and high premium on privacy, they have 
not come rushing to the experimental stage. This research team, however, has 
conducted a series of low-budget experiments – generally consisting of short pen-
and-paper exercises resembling quizzes, distributed and collected at judicial 
conferences – that have yielded fascinating results about heuristics and biases 
(Guthrie et al. 2001, 2007). In this more recent set of experiments they turned their 
attention to emotion. Judges read fictional scenarios and decided highly technical 
questions of law – for example, whether the text of a medical marijuana statute 
should be understood to require that a doctor’s affidavit of medical necessity be 
generated before or after an arrest. Half of the judges read scenarios in which the 
litigants were sympathetic and/or likeable; half read scenarios in which they were 
not. Despite the clear legal irrelevance of this variation, judges were more likely to 
interpret law in a manner more favourable to the sympathetic parties, and less 
favourable to the unsympathetic ones (Wistrich et al. 2015). The experiments thus 
provide evidence that judges’ legal decisions might be shaped in part by the “affect 
heuristic”, that is, a rapid, felt sense of goodness/liking or badness/disliking that 
drives choices we then rationalize (Slovic et al. 2002). The affect heuristic “is an 
instance of substitution, in which the answer to an easy question (How do I feel about 
it?) serves as an answer to a harder question (What do I think about it?)” (Kahneman 
2011, p. 139). In this instance, the research suggests that a judge’s “feeling” about 
the affected party shapes his or her “thinking” about how to interpret ambiguous 
sources of law (cf. Chestek 2009). 
The first strength of these experiments is their use of judicial subjects, thus 
eliminating the ecological validity challenge commonly levied against mock-juror 
studies, particularly those using undergraduate students (Epstein and Martin 2014). 
The second is Wistrich, Rachlinski and Guthrie’s clever isolation of a legally irrelevant, 
emotionally-tinged variable, which allows them to make a clean argument about 
causation (Singleton and Straits 2005, p. 155). Their between-subjects design, in 
which no judge knew that any element was being varied, allows them to get at a 
phenomenon that judges would likely not be able to describe or might misrepresent 
if asked, one that runs directly counter to cultural expectations of “objective” legal 
decision-making. However, the artificiality of the experimental setting – the precise 
thing that allows the independent and dependent variables to be isolated – also is a 
weakness. Prominent empirical legal researchers, and some judges, have expressed 
doubt about the extent to which the trio’s studies relate to what happens in real cases 
(Epstein and Martin 2014). Even the trio acknowledges the limitations of using short 
written hypotheticals, administered at a conference, to gauge highly complex 
phenomena that judges in real life experience over time, while embedded in 
multifaceted settings, and with real people attached (Wistrich et al. 2015). This is a 
common problem in experimental design: internal validity can be in strong tension 
with external validity. A final weakness is the bridge the researchers draw between 
the affect heuristic and emotion more generally; the latter is comprised of much more 
than quick, reactive senses of liking and disliking, of good and bad, and judges’ 
diverse emotional experiences and their decisional impacts cannot be fully captured 
by this experimental design (Maroney 2015). Theses critiques do not diminish the 
importance of what Wistrich, Rachlinski and Guthrie are able to show. Their findings 
Terry Maroney   Empirically investigating… 
 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 9, n. 5 (2019), 799-830 
ISSN: 2079-5971 820 
may be narrow, but they intriguingly prompt us to find new ways to probe how affect 
and emotion might shape legal decision-making. 
4.5.4. Interaction and Legal culture 
Two studies led by Jennifer Scarduzio shed important light on how judges’ public, 
interactional emotional displays and behaviours shape, are shaped by, and 
sometimes defy the cultural expectations of their courts. In the first (Scarduzio 
2011), she used the observation, shadowing, and interviewing triad to investigate 
how U.S. municipal court judges in an urban area used “emotional deviance” from 
culturally salient norms in the public-facing aspects of their work, and how power and 
status fuelled such deviance (Scarduzio 2011, p. 289). Her fieldwork with 12 judges 
in two locations revealed two dominant feeling rules for judges in the busy criminal 
courtroom: neutrality and the expression of fairness, both reached through selective 
suppression of emotion expressions. However, it also revealed important departures 
in the form of humour, “displays of anger and frustration, emotional leakage in 
nonverbal displays” such as eye rolling, and “outright abuses of power through rude 
emotional displays” (Scarduzio 2011, p. 294). Thus, a space between ideal and reality 
becomes visible: “emotions that judges are expected to express in the courtroom 
and the emotions that actually emerge implicitly and nonverbally during the legal 
process are not always the same” (Scarduzio 2011, p. 296). Moments of emotional 
deviance were enabled by status and power; were noticeable because of their 
departure from norms; and were often used interactionally, in an effort to control the 
behaviours of others, particularly litigants. In a later study involving the same courts, 
Scarduzio and Tracy (2015) added further depth to this meeting point of culture and 
interaction by including court staff, including bailiffs and interpreters. This novel 
move also implicates those persons’ evaluation of the judges’ emotional behaviours. 
Scarduzio and Tracy argued from their data that bailiffs act as an “emotional buffer” 
between judges and defendants, that trio interacting “to shape emotions and the 
collective contextual environment through their communication and expressions”, 
together creating and breaking the “sense” of what is transpiring (Scarduzio and 
Tracy 2015, p. 10). This study is laudable for providing a rare examination of the role 
of staff in policing emotion norms, including by mediating the influence of norm 
breaks.  
A similar focus on the lessons of cultural and interactional deviance may be found in 
Roach Anleu, Mack, and Rottman’s ongoing study that, like the work of Glynn and 
Sen, leverages on-the-shelf data. They use “two sources of publicly available 
information that can be used to identify the role emotion plays in disciplinary actions” 
against sitting state-court judges in the United States (Roach Anleu et al. 2016, p. 
65): the archives of the Center for Judicial Ethics, and the public disciplinary records 
of the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct. Within these sources the researchers 
identify that subset of disciplinary actions involving emotions like anger, frustration, 
and antagonism, then performing a content analysis of the case materials, including 
transcripts. Such disciplinary cases by definition involve marked emotional deviance 
in interactions with others, generally litigants and the public. This study nicely 
displays the necessary interplay between method, research question, and permissible 
conclusions. As the authors acknowledge, the available data represent only the “tip 
of the iceberg” (Roach Anleu et al. 2016, p. 69), as few inappropriate judicial emotion 
displays result in disciplinary proceedings, and few disciplinary proceedings result in 
findings. The authors therefore rightly refrain from claiming that the data “provide a 
comprehensive or representative overview of the range of cases that entail emotion 
display and judicial misconduct” (Roach Anleu et al. 2016, p. 66), and acknowledge 
their limits in illuminating “the wider or general role of emotions in judicial behavior” 
(Roach Anleu et al. 2016, p. 69). However, those data are well-suited to an “extreme 
cases” approach, in which atypical cases shed light on the sorts of situations in which 
judges’ emotions are regarded as well outside culturally accepted bounds, which can 
help us understand those bounds. Those cases show at least some of the concrete 
consequences of such abnormal behaviour, both for the litigants (whose rights may 
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be impaired), the judge (whose career may suffer), and the public (whose confidence 
in the courts may be diminished). Looking at the by-consensus worst judicial 
behaviour can reveal how the public and disciplinary bodies evaluate emotion norm 
noncompliance, how they theorize the links between emotional dysregulation and 
behaviour, and how they think about what sorts of emotional dysregulation might be 
remediable, and how – the last of these also shedding light on notions of possible 
emotional transformation. 
5. Areas for future exploration 
While the universe of empirical studies of judicial emotion remains small, when 
grouped together – as they are here, for the first time – they form a rich mosaic. 
However, the mosaic remains incomplete, with many missing pieces. Among my 
proposed theoretical approaches, those involving evaluation and transformation 
remain the least-well represented. Among the many available methods, 
experimentation appears to be the least frequently used. A thread pulling across all 
the extant studies is the enormous diversity of not just judicial emotion but the 
judiciary itself, and the concomitant need to attend closely to those sources of 
diversity, be they gender, race, geography, level of court, nature of docket, or job 
security; some studies are more explicitly attentive to such factors than others, and 
we collectively should be raising that bar (Wingfield 2010). Before concluding, this 
section briefly touches on other areas that are ripe for empirical exploration. 
Databases are not the only available source for pre-existing materials that can be 
systematically collected and analysed. Some such materials are generated by judges 
themselves – not just written opinions in cases but also speeches, notes, diaries, 
letters, books, and articles. The widely-revered U.S. Judge Learned Hand, for 
example, wrote letters to friends and judicial colleagues reflecting on emotional 
aspects of his work (Jordan 2013). U.S. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo 
delivered a series of lectures reflecting deeply on how emotion and reason intertwined 
in his decision-making (Cardozo 1941/1957), and wrote books – including his iconic 
The Nature of the Judicial Process – doing the same (Cardozo 1921). In more recent 
years, multiple judges have written memoirs in which they discuss a wide range of 
emotions, how they have worked to manage them, and their possible impact in cases 
(Gilmore 2010, Block 2012, Corbett 2016, Newman 2017). Judges have grappled 
openly with questions of empathy, anger, stress, and other emotional phenomena in 
articles for academic, judicial, and popular audiences (Kirby 1997a, 1997b, Thomas 
1997, O’Brien 2004, Posner 2008, Chin 2012). These narratives are highly likely to 
be shaped social desirability biases (van Boom et al. 2018) and to reflect judges’ high 
attunement to audience, seeking popularity among and respect from peers, lawyers, 
other government officials, and the public (Baum 2006). They nonetheless are 
priceless views into judges’ mental maps (Luker 2008). Judicial biographies, too, are 
a rich source for discerning judicial emotion, the norms against which they unfold, 
the events that precipitate them, the relationships within which they are situated, 
and how they are managed (Domnarski 2016).  
A similar point may be made about media representations of judges’ behaviours. 
Indeed, print journalism long was one of the only ways in which laypersons could 
learn about what was happening in the courts. As the broadcast media and internet 
have proliferated and as jurisdictions increasingly allow cameras in courtrooms, third-
person reporting commonly includes videos, audio recordings, and photographs. 
While most such materials capture judges’ public appearances, private behaviour 
sometimes also comes to light. A state-court judge in Texas came under fire when 
his daughter posted on YouTube a video of him beating her in their home (Maroney 
2012). The modern proliferation of multimedia sources capturing an ever-broadening 
swath of judicial behaviour serves up a rich trove of material with which to work. A 
nodding reference to the livestream of the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings 
(2018) for then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh to the U.S. Supreme Court – replete with 
vivid, norm-defying emotional displays – makes the point, as does Justice 
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Kavanaugh’s opinion piece in a major newspaper the next day describing himself as 
“emotional”, “perhaps too emotional at times”, and asking that readers consider the 
reasons for his strong emotions and to judge him as a “son, husband, and dad” 
(Kavanaugh 2018).  
Finally, as methods of studying emotion continue to proliferate across disciplines, we 
surely will see new methods moving into the judicial space. Important judicial 
leaders, such as the Federal Judicial Center, are actively encouraging judges to 
explore mindfulness strategies (Fogel 2016; see also http://themindfuljudge.com/). 
Perhaps soon we will see experiments testing whether mindfulness training for judges 
reduces levels of irritation and anger, increases displays of patience, alters other 
behaviours relevant to demeanour, or increases markers of personal well-being and 
professional satisfaction (Powell 2018). Neuroimaging cannot be far away, as 
researchers (including several sitting judges) already are examining the distinct 
neural pathways for determining fault and assigning punishment, a distinction 
thought to implicate emotion (Ginther et al. 2016; see also MacArthur Foundation 
Research Network on Law and Neuroscience, http://www.lawneuro.org/). The 
popularity of “microexpressions” research is another obvious candidate 
(www.paulekman.com). One can imagine a lab coding video of judges on the bench, 
in an attempt to spot ‘leakage’ of concealed emotion. Microexpression training, now 
a commercial product, might be marketed to, and tested on, judges as a tool for 
improving their emotional intelligence. Novelty, of course, is not the same as 
strength. Whether any new empirical angle on judicial emotion yields genuinely new 
insights built on a solid foundation remains to be seen, and depends in no small part 
on our collective willingness to analyse it with open-minded rigor. 
6. Conclusion 
The best news about the empirical study of judicial emotion is that there is so much 
to be done. Virtually any research approach is likely to have value in this relatively 
unexplored terrain, and many of the studies explored here point to the next set of 
questions in need of answers. Similarly, the range of methods available to study 
judicial emotion is exactly as wide as the range of methods used by the many 
disciplines with an interest in this area. However, no method is easy to pull off well, 
and each carries distinct advantages and disadvantages. The researcher of judicial 
emotion is well-served by considering a variety of ways in which to get at her research 
questions, thoroughly educating herself in ones with which she may be unfamiliar, 
partnering with allies with more solid grounding in those methods, and making fully 
informed choices based on her resources – resources of access, time, personnel, and 
skill – in light of what best serves her ultimate aims. By bringing together the universe 
of extant research in one place, situating them within a unifying theoretical frame, 
highlighting areas of overlap and difference, locating sources that invite a deeper 
dive into the methodological weeds, and suggesting areas where growth is most 
needed, this article hopes to accelerate the field’s development. 
That development promises to be exciting, and calls for disciplined interdisciplinarity 
(Maroney 2011). Insights may emerge from a certain “pedantic eclecticism” (Simon 
2010), characterized by creative mixing of perspectives and methods in order to get 
at interesting, hard-to-reach questions (Maroney 2011). It is important, however, to 
continue to invest in the foundational theory-building work, particularly qualitative 
work, we still so sorely need. If observational and interview studies are resource-
intensive, fMRI studies are far more so, and with a much less obvious payoff while 
we still have so many baseline questions. It is my hope that this overview, and the 
other work represented in this special volume, will spur the vital and creative work 
of discovery and, as we continue down the road, verification.  
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